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Abstract 
 
Market-based administrative reform has led to a sustained argument among in the 
public administration field. Some applaud this development on the grounds that it 
makes public service cheaper and more customer-oriented. Others argue that the 
public sector is not just another service-producing system delivering "public value" 
but rather that it stands for legality, due process, legal security as well as being a 
service provider. The article compares the impact of market-based reform in 
Rechtsstaat administrative systems and the Anglo-American “public interest systems. 
It also compares traditional public administration with an NPM-model at different 
stages of the policy process. The article reviews the potential democratic downsides to 
market solutions in the public administration by highlighting the core elements of 
"publicness" and the extent to which private sector organizations can deliver "public 
value". 
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This article makes three arguments concerning the implementation of market-based 
reform in the public sector in different national contexts.1 First, by differentiating 
between different Rechtsstaat and “public interest” models of public administration, the 
article demonstrates the powerful challenges that administrative norms related to legality 
present to such reform. Partly for this reason, Rechtsstaat countries have introduced such 
reform in a more piece-meal and less conspicuous process, compared to countries like 
Britain, Australia or New Zeeland.  
 Secondly, the paper argues that the application of economic theories more 
broadly on public administration creates conflict with the endogenous norms and values 
in the public bureaucracy. These norms relate to legality, transparency and equal 
treatment which are core Rechtstaat values. However, public interest systems, too, have 
institutional obstacles to a full-scale implementation of market-based reform in those 
areas of the public service where legal authority is exercised. 
 Third, the paper puts forward the argument that the “publicness” of the 
public administration is essential to the role of public institutions in the process of 
governing. Bringing in market actors into public service, particularly in areas that are 
sensitive to citizens’ personal integrity and where legal authority is exercised over the 
individual, challenges the “publicness” of the administration and may undermine popular 
trust in political institutions. 
Inefficiency and irresponsible spending, coupled with red tape, insensitivity 
to individual needs and an obsession with process are perennial accusations against 
public bureaucracies in almost all countries of the world. The root problem has been 
                                                 
1 The title of the article alludes to John Hibbing and Elisabeth Theiss-Morse’s book Stealth Democracy 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). 
 
 1
identified as the tax financed nature of the organization and the lack of competition; 
public bureaucracies have been seen as simply lacking incentives to modernize, to 
become more efficient, or to deliver good service. Against that backdrop, a large number 
of countries have implemented projects to inject corporate sector models of 
organizational management and client—or, as it were, customer—service in order to give 
tax payers more bang for the buck. Sometimes the main role models in that reform effort 
have been for-profit organizations while at other times there has been a notion of going 
back in time to rediscover what was lost during the course of reform (Aucoin, 1990; 
Light, 1997, 2006). 
 Efficiency and making public money last longer have been important 
concerns to western governments for a long time. The argument that taxes are too high 
has political currency almost regardless of tax levels, which means that no government is 
immune from attacks for over-taxing its population and careless spending of the 
taxpayers’ money. Also in welfare-state countries where taxes are high but where public 
services and welfare systems are noticeable, policy makers and bureaucrats need to know 
where their resources are going and how they are spent. Thus, some concern with 
efficiency and good management has been present in government for a long period of 
time. This article is less concerned with those aspects of economic thinking in the public 
sector. The focus here is rather on the paradigmatic shift during the 1980s and 1990s 
towards bringing in economic theory into public sector decision making and 
management. 
From time to time, there has been an interest among economists to address 
the problem of public sector inefficiencies, or, as economists like Milton Friedman and 
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James Buchanan would put it, “government failure” (Buchanan, 1975; Friedmann, 1962; 
for an overview, see Lane, 1993). Public choice theory—“the economics of non-market 
decision making” (Muller, 1979:1)—represents an attempt to bring economic theory into 
public-sector economics and decision making. This approach, which was later replicated 
with a focus on decision-making rules (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965), party strategies 
(Downs, 1957) and bureaucratic strategies within public organizations (Niskanen, 1971), 
offered a challenging and alternative way of looking at political institutions and political 
behavior. With regard to efficiency problems, public choice theory demonstrated the vast 
differences between market-based allocation of resources and the budgetary process 
found in public bureaucracies. Again, the analysis substantiated systemic economic 
inefficiency and arrogance towards clients, as manifested in red tape and the absence of 
any real choice.  
Public choice theory made important inroads into the political sphere in the 
1980s (see Madrick, 2009). The Reagan Administration in the United States and Mrs. 
Thatcher’s government in Britain, equally determined to reverse the development of an 
ever-growing public encroachment of the market and individual freedom, saw qualities in 
public choice theory as a model of reforming the public bureaucracy. By breaking up 
public monopolies, creating market-like models of customer choice, cutting taxes and 
deregulating markets, these governments embarked on a neo-liberal project aiming at 
curbing public-sector growth and “unleashing” private initiative. 
Underlying and sustaining these developments was a fundamental, but 
rarely explicated, normative notion that public sector organizations, both in their internal 
structure and processes and in their exchanges with their external environments, were not 
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fundamentally different from for-profit organizations. From that perspective, it was easy 
to see why an import of management models from the corporate sector would solve the 
inefficiency problems in the public sector. Certainly, there was an acknowledgement that 
the public sector differed in one important sense in that it is tax financed—a significant 
source of its problems, according to its critics—but organizational management and 
customer relations could, and should, emulate those applied by private sector 
organizations.  
The degree of public sector specificity is thus critical to an understanding of 
the influence and guidance that business management can offer to the public bureaucracy 
(Pierre, 2000). The greater the extent to which there are tasks, norms, values, procedures 
and societal roles that set public sector organizations apart from all other types of 
organizations, the smaller the extent to which those organizations can incorporate 
elements of the organizational design and modus operandi typical to organizations 
outside the public sector. Moreover, public administration is not merely a system of 
service production; it is also an essential element in democratic governance. Therefore, 
an assessment of the contribution of economic theory to public administration must also 
include the extent to which market-based reform interferes in the democratic role of the 
public administration, or, conversely, if such reform offers a contribution to the 
performance of that role. 
This article will critically assess the contribution of economic theory to 
administrative reform with particular attention to its ramifications on public service 
production as well as the democratic and governance roles of the public bureaucracy. The 
article does not deliver a detailed, country-by-country assessment of the significance of 
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economic theory in shaping administrative reform. Rather, the purpose of the article is to 
uncover the systemic, institutional and cultural factors that seem to promote or obstruct 
market-based administrative reform, and also to look more closely at the specific 
contributions offered by such reform as well as what the main problems caused by it. 
There has been a great deal of debate on what might explain the noticeable differences 
among countries with regards to their implementation of market-based (NPM) reform. 
The article seeks to contribute to that debate by highlighting the consistencies and 
inconsistencies between the micro-foundations of the Rechtsstaat and “public interest” 
models of public administration. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section looks at the trajectory 
of reform in different types of administrative systems and cultures with particular 
emphasis on NPM administrative reform. The article then reviews a couple of different 
ways in which economic theory has influenced administrative reform design, ranging 
from the presentation of concrete and specific reform concepts to redirecting the 
discourse of public administration towards public sector notions of organizational 
efficiency and management. Following that, we look at the process of public service 
delivery to see how market-based reform offer alternative solutions to the traditional 
model of citizen input, management, resource allocation, accountability, and feedback. A 
concluding discussion closes the article. 
 
The Policy or Non-Policy of Administrative reform 
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Over the past couple of decades, market-based reform in different shapes have been 
implemented across the western world, the Antipodes, many Asian countries and also, to 
a varying degree, in the developing world (see Halligan, 2001, 2003; Hood, 1991; 
Manning, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Turner, 2002). However, the degree to 
which market-based public management reform has been implemented in different 
national contexts and different types of administrative systems and traditions varies 
considerably (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Peters, 2001). The bulk of the article is 
focused on the degree to which the NPM model of administrative reform is compatible 
with different types of public administrative systems; the degree to which such reform 
has been manifested in explicit policies of reform in different types of administrative 
systems; and the influence of economic theory on public administration more broadly. 
Different national (and regional) cultures present very different 
preconditions for reform in terms of the societal embeddedness of the public 
administration, the state-centeredness of society, and popular perceptions of collective vs. 
individual action. This cluster of variables constitutes part of the administrative tradition 
of a country and this tradition, in turn, holds a good part of the explanation to why some 
countries have adopted NPM more extensively and rapidly than others (Painter and 
Peters, 2009). Thus, in Rechtsstaat administrative systems where values like uniformity, 
legality, expertise, accountability, due process, equality, citizenship and legal security are 
paramount, the NPM model has encountered more difficulties in generating acceptance 
compared to countries with a “public interest” model of public administration. This 
model emphasizes service, performance, contractual rights, protection of individual rights 
but also accountability, managerialism and professionalism in the public service. 
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Most of the European and Scandinavian countries are examples of the 
Rechtsstaat administrative tradition (Dyson, 1980; Berki and Hayward, 1979). The state-
centric nature of these countries does not mean, however, that there has been consensus 
on political issues related to the balance between the public and private spheres of 
society. On the contrary; while the propensity for collective action is stronger compared 
to, for instance, the United States, the countries have witnessed a high level of political 
conflict throughout postwar period concerning public and private ownership, state 
intervention in markets and other issues along the left-right dimension of politics. This 
conflict has shaped the political discourse in much of Europe for the past several decades, 
even in the so-called consensual democracies in Scandinavia (Elder et al., 1988). 
The Anglo-American democracies and the Antipodes would fall into the 
“public interest” category of countries. In Britain, the United States and Canada, market-
based reform was introduced and implemented as part of a larger neo-liberal project 
headed by Mrs. Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Brian Mulroney, respectively (Savoie, 
1994; Suleiman, 2003). In Australia and New Zealand, there was as much bureaucrat-
bashing as in those three countries but the ideological context was different. Interestingly, 
although Australia and New Zealand were the countries where NPM was implemented 
most extensively, administrative reform in the Antipodes has not been tied to neo-liberal 
ideological currents as much as it was in Britain and the U.S. 
 Meanwhile, and in a much less conspicuous and value-driven process, 
market-based models have, albeit with significant national variation, penetrated the state 
through the public administration in the Rechtsstaat countries. If the introduction of NPM 
in the public interest group of countries was prefaced with a neo-liberal all-out attack on 
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the state, market-based reform was introduced in the Rechtsstaat countries was 
characterized by the opposite pattern. In Norway, administrative reform was mainly path-
dependent and NPM ideas were brought in ad hoc in an incremental fashion (Laegreid et 
al, 2008). Similarly in Sweden, administrative reform during the 1980s and early 1990s 
signaled a new direction towards modernization with only very limited market-based 
features (Munk Christiansen, 1998; Pierre, 1993). Later, NPM reform was introduced 
gradually and without policy reassessment. 
In France, administrative reform was implemented “without doctrine”; 
market-based reform could not penetrate the corporatist orientation of the public service. 
Instead, the corps assumed (or maintained) control of reform. As a result, management 
reforms have been “only instrumental; they cannot change themselves the basic 
characteristics of the administrative system because they are disconnected from a global 
set of market-oriented values and because they do not fit within any kind of clear doctrine 
or new state philosophy” (Rouban, 2008:135). Thus, a full-scale adoption of NPM reform 
was not an option as the norms and values both in society and in the public administration 
would not have supported such a reform. 
The inconsistency between the embedded values of public administration in 
the Rechtsstaat countries and the core values sustaining NPM holds a significant part of 
the explanation to the non-policy of reform in those countries. The best way to describe 
NPM reform in the Rechtsstaat countries is reform “by stealth”. Since the neo-liberal 
foundation of NPM is at odds with the state-centric and collectivist political culture of 
these societies, market-based reform has been introduced subtly, ad hoc, and at the 
administrative level instead of at the political level. If NPM reform in the “public 
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interest” group of countries was the result of a “deductive” process where an overall 
ideological turn preceded administrative reform, the reform pattern in the Rechtsstaat 
countries has been that of an “inductive process” where reform has been implemented 
within the pre-existing ideological and normative framework. 
This observation offers some ideas about the strategies that were available 
to politicians in Rechtsstaat systems who wanted to bring in at least some elements of 
market-based reform into their public service. The chief reason why NPM, despite the 
cultural and ideological obstacles, was considered as a model of administrative reform 
was that it several of its objectives were attractive also to politicians and senior civil 
servants in the Rechtsstaat countries. NPM promised to cut costs in the public service, 
enhance client, or customer, satisfaction, and liberate politicians from controlling public 
service production and delivery; ideas that were just as palatable to the political and 
administrative leadership in both Rechtsstaat as they were in “public interest” systems. 
The preferred strategy in the west European context has been a step-by-step 
process wherein NPM-inspired reform concepts have been introduced without normative 
or ideological overtones. In France—again, “without doctrine” (Rouban, 2008)—the so-
called LFOF (loi organique sur les lois de finances) plan was put in place 2005-2006, 
introducing program budgeting, performance indicators and giving autonomy to 
managers (Cole, 2008; Rouban, 2008). In Germany, “New Public Management” did not 
go down well with the Weberian ideals of administration, but “Neue Politische Steurung” 
(in translation “new political steering”) was apparently more attractive and became 
widely adopted as a new model for politico-administrative relationships, not entirely 
unlike the NPM model (see Grande and Pratorius, 2003). 
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Similarly, in Norway and Sweden, management by objective was 
introduced during the 1990s and was later accompanied by output-based budgeting, 
performance measurement and the creation of customer choice and internal markets. 
Again, the process was conducted within the pre-existing system of rules and norms and 
without an overarching assessment of the normative foundation of the public 
administration (Blomqvist, 2004; Christensen and Laegreid, 1998; Gustafsson and 
Svensson, 1999; Premfors, 2002).  
The list of this type of moderate market-based reform in Rechtsstaat 
administrative systems could be made longer, but the point we want to make should be 
clear. The promise of NPM to curb public service costs was too sweet to be rejected 
(particularly in several West European countries in the early 1990s where the financial 
situation was strained) and the idea of managerial autonomy too tempting to be 
disregarded. Instead of paving the way for NPM reform by an ideological reassessment, 
which would have had little support both among the electorate and the political elite, 
NPM reform was brought in “by stealth”, through the backdoor. It was implemented 
extensively among local and regional authorities. At the central government level, reform 
was not initiated at the political level but evolved within the public bureaucracy. Reform 
was imported from transnational organizations like the OECD and was disseminated by 
international “epistemic communities”. Administrative practices and modus operandi 
gradually turned in the NPM direction, efficiency was emphasized and contracting out, 
competitive tendering, management by contract and internal markets soon became 
everyday concepts in the public administration jargon, all contained within the 
Rechtsstaat tradition. 
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This subtle strategy of introducing market-based administrative reform has 
not been confined to the European Rechtsstaat countries. In the Southeast Asian 
countries, NPM was to some degree imposed by international institutions like IMF and, 
more importantly, by the World Bank during the 1990s with a substantive degree of 
domestic compliance (Turner, 2002). Similarly, in much of the developing world, NPM 
was brought in by donor organizations as a means of developing the public 
administration, with only limited consideration to the institutional preconditions of such 
reform (Manning, 2001; Schick, 1998). Market-based reform in the public sector, 
coupled with privatization and the deregulation of domestic markets were all part of the 
World Bank’s “good governance” campaign which transmitted neo-liberal values across 
the developing world. Clearly, reform in these parts of the world has not been 
characterized by subtlety; developing countries have faced bigger problems in resisting 
NPM compared to developed countries because it was tied to larger development projects 
which were critical to the recipient countries. 
 Among the developed countries, this strategy could only work if NPM 
reform, and an economic approach to public administration more broadly, was 
“decoupled” from the normative framework of public administration. Given that core 
values in the public administration such as legality and equal treatment prevented a full-
scale introduction of NPM, the practice of public administration and public service had to 
be separated from the norms sustaining the public administration. Such “decoupling” is 
not necessarily dysfunctional to the organization but rather a strategy to cope with a 
complex environment or competing or inconsistent demands (Brunsson, 1989). 
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In the context of public administration this issue takes a somewhat different 
spin because these norms define not only intra-organizational procedures and behavior 
but the relationship between the public administration and its clients as well. Thus, while 
the public administration internally can relax the relationship between its rhetoric and its 
practice, the clients of the organization have a more difficult time understanding the 
discrepancy between the promise and performance of the bureaucracy.2 The outcome 
appears to have been that clients/customers now want both models of administration; they 
appreciate the right to choose among different service providers and the service that are 
better attuned to individual needs at the same time as they still subscribe to legality, 
equality and procedural fairness.  
Thus, the absence of a distinct policy of administrative reform has not been 
conducive to the reform process. Such a policy would have served several important 
purposes. It would have created harmony between the normative norms and values that 
sustain the public administration, its modus operandi, and the external expectations on the 
public administration. Also, a coherent and thought-through policy of reform would have 
defined NPM and given it distinct boundaries, i.e. a policy would have defined what 
sectors of the public administration that were to be reformed in an NPM fashion and 
which sectors should be exempt from such reform. Furthermore, a distinct policy of 
reform would probably have resolved goal conflicts within the public administration—
between efficiency and legal security, between customer-attuned service and equal 
treatment, and between procedural legitimacy and performance-based legitimacy—which 
                                                 
2 In Sweden, there are several instances reported where public servants are having problems balancing 
increasing demands on efficiency against the continuing emphasis on legal security. Also, the emphasis on 
service which is central to Swedish administrative law sometimes is at odds with objectives like equal 
treatment and procedural fairness (see Schierenbeck, 2003). 
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currently have to be resolved ad hoc as part of administrative practice. Also, a 
comprehensive policy of administrative reform would perhaps have invigorated public 
discourse on public administration and helped articulate the pros and cons of alternative 
models of public administration. 
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the non-policy of reform has 
been that practice has shaped debate and discourse, not the other way around. This would 
perhaps not have been a problem had it not been for the fact that this reform has 
ramifications that are both internal and external to the public bureaucracy. While the 
intra-organizational problems of adapting to new objectives can be handled within the 
existing structures, changes in how the public bureaucracy organizes its exchanges with 
clients and other external actors are far more difficult to design and manage, as 
mentioned earlier. 
This is where public debate on what kind of public bureaucracy a country 
should have would have helped foster a new kind of external exchanges and also help the 
public learn what to expect from its public administration. Instead, public debate and 
discourse on NPM reform has been typically ex post and reactive, particularly in the 
Rechtsstaat countries where reform was not as ideologically charged as in some of the 
“public interest” countries. The tenor of this ex post debate has been a weakening of 
traditional public administration such as loss of accountability, insufficient whistle-
blower protection and substandard public service quality. To some degree, this pattern is 
indicative of rapid change in a core societal function with little or no debate on the 
desirability and nature of those changes.  
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Thus, to sum up this section, the introduction of market-based 
administrative reform was a very different process in Rechtsstaat countries than it was in 
the “public interest” systems. In the former systems, with their emphasis on legality, 
equal treatment and group rights, NPM faced a cluster of obstacles to gain acceptance. 
Also, this group of countries shares a collectivistic political culture and the neo-liberal 
“turn” in many other countries during the 1980s and 1990s did not gain foothold in the 
Rechtsstaat countries. In the “public interest” countries, on the other hand, a powerful 
neo-liberal campaign preceded NPM and the political culture was more individualistic 
and market-embracing. For these reasons, reform emerged in many countries “by 
stealth”, with rather limited public exposure, limited debate, and within the framework of 
a traditional public administration discourse. The result has been an emerging dissonance 
between popular expectations on the public bureaucracy on the one hand and its modus 
operandi on the other. 
 
Stealth Economy: Three Types of Economic Influence on the Public Bureaucracy 
 
Leaving aside the type of economic and financial control and evaluation that any 
organization with a sizeable budget engages in, it is interesting to note how the influence 
of economics and economic thinking, broadly speaking, on public administration has 
varied considerably over the past several decades. Moreover, it is important to distinguish 
between different types of processes through which economic theory, practice, and values 
have been injected into the public administration. Particularly in the Rechtsstaat systems, 
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there seems to be three different levels at which economic thinking has entered the field 
of public administration. 
Perhaps the most concrete, action-oriented type of economic influence is 
where administrative reform uses for-profit organizations as models or benchmarks in 
order to identify sources of inefficiency in public-sector organizations. The general idea 
here is that some import of budgeting and assessment techniques developed in the private 
sector can help uncover the actual costs associated with government programs and their 
administration. Ideas and practices related to organizational management are imported 
into the public sector based on, or as part of, a critique launched by corporate leaders 
against public sector rigidities and inefficiencies (such as, for instance, the Grace 
Commission in the United States in the 1960s or the Lindbeck Commission3 in Sweden 
in the early 1990s; see Peters, 2001). The typical argument here is that the public sector 
would have much to learn from private business management in terms of organizational 
efficiency, cost control and customer satisfaction. For the most part, this is a kind of 
influence which does not challenge the basic normative structure of the public 
administration but rather which tends to be conducted within that framework. 
A second, perhaps more sophisticated type of economic influence on public 
administration has been the application of economic theory on public administration. As 
mentioned earlier, the 1980s witnessed a growing interest among economists in applying 
economic theory on public administration and public service provision. Public choice 
theory—to some degree a precursor to rational choice theory—was an important 
                                                 
3 The Lindbeck Commission was a Royal Commission appointed to investigate problems with weak 
economic growth in Sweden. Its report (SOU 993:16) identified a number of political and institutional 
obstacles to growth and argued that Constitutional reform was critical to enhance the economic 
performance in the country. 
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contribution to public administration research, in several ways, as we saw earlier. The 
model sought to clarify the linkage between payment and services. It also brought in the 
notion of choice and markets for public services. Public choice theorists came under 
attack for presenting an ideologically biased account of public administration and for 
missing the point of collective, tax-financed problem solving altogether (see, for instance, 
Self, 1993). This type of influence would also include cost-benefit analysis and other 
analytical models where economic theory is utilized to assign costs to different public 
service options, sometimes even where such costs are difficult to assign, e.g. in areas like 
social work and police work (for an overview, see Vining and Weimer, 2006).4 The 
difference between this and the former type of influenced is that in this type, different 
economic models are applied to specific processes within the public administration 
without challenging the basic premise or normative framework of the public bureaucracy. 
The third type of influence by economic theory on public administration has 
targeted the discourse of public administration. From a market, neo-liberal perspective, 
the point of departure is that of free individuals and markets and any public encroachment 
on those liberties should be assessed with great caution. This perspective stands in stark 
contrast to the state-centric perspective where collective action is perceived as a strategy 
of governing society. Public administration is at the heart of this clash between 
individualism and collectivism since it is the public structure with which individuals 
interact most frequently and where much of individuals’ daily life is regulated. 
In order to bring in private sector management philosophies, customer 
choice, and market mechanisms into the public sector, reformers must remove the 
                                                 
4 There are significant problems involved in conducting cost-benefit analyses on client-intensive services, 
or sectors  where pre-emptive work is essential such as police services. 
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normative obstacles to such reform by rephrasing the discourse of public administration, 
from one which emphasizes Rechtsstaat norms and values to one which emphasizes 
efficiency, service, and customer satisfaction. Put in a slightly different way, reform was 
predicated on a change in discourse so that the organizational, legal and procedural 
specificity of the public administration could be downplayed or removed altogether. 
Public service production and public management thus become “generic” organizational 
tasks and in that perspective emulating organizational design and managements in for-
profit organizations, where efficiency is higher, became the obvious solution to the 
problems facing the public administration (see Peters, 2001). 
The emergence of NPM drew precisely on such a change in discourse. 
Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) model of administration argues that the public sector 
should only engage in those core governmental roles that the market could not fulfill. 
Also, the notion of replacing citizens with customers is a distinct change in discourse. To 
be sure, the very features that set public organizations apart from private-sector 
organizations (Christensen et al., 2007) were identified as the most obvious and 
significant obstacles to modernization and rationalization. The concept of “public 
management”—itself a manifestation of the market-based discourse on public 
administration—represents an import of private sector management into the public sector; 
as Rosenbloom (1988:16) notes, “those who define public administration in managerial 
terms tend to minimize the distinctions between public and private administration”. The 
tendency to “minimize the distinctions” between the public bureaucracy and for-profit 
organizations was not an accident; it was part of a new, market-based discourse on public 
administration based in, and articulating, a denial of public-sector specificity which, in 
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turn, set the stage for market-based administrative reform (cf. Maier, 1987). If managing 
public and private organizations is a “generic”, non-sector specific task, then there is no 
reason why the public sector should not have much to gain from emulating private sector 
management models.  
In all these three different types of processes through which economic 
thinking has influenced public administration, there is an implicit focus on those public-
sector organizations whose main role is to deliver public service. Organizational 
functions and modus operandi that distinctly set the public sector apart from the corporate 
world—the differentia specifica of the public sector—were largely ignored. Certainly, the 
fact that the public bureaucracy is tax-financed, hierarchically organized and rule-driven 
was duly noted but there was very little understanding of the historical explanation to 
those organizational features and the problems they posed for any comparison with the 
organizations of the corporate world. 
Market-based reform has proven to be most difficult to implement in those 
areas of the public service where the requirements for legality and legal security are the 
strongest, i.e. where the public administration exercises law and authority over the 
individual. Even here, however, market solutions are now making their entry, for instance 
in public surveillance and street patrolling but also in administrative processes where 
integrity and legality are essential, like producing advice on child custody cases. These 
cases of market solution beg the question of how to define the core of “publicness” in 
public administration. The issue is bigger than simply an organizational or managerial 
one although reform designers sometimes tend to overlook, or ignore, the wider 
ramifications of their reform on the “publicness” of the public service, and why that 
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“publicness matters. It also speaks to fundamental democratic aspects of the public 
administration. As Guy Peters puts it, “as government loses control over functions 
considered to be public, it may lose the ability to effectively direct the society; it may 
lose the steering ability that constitutes the root of what we call government” (Peters, 
2008:379). Thus, the “publicness” of the bureaucracy is essential to its contribution to 
democratic governance, both in terms of its capacity to steer and regulate society and in 
its exchanges with citizens. “Publicnness” is shorthand for legality, transparency, 
accountability, political oversight, procedurial fairness, equality and equal treatment. 
Remove any or all of those organizational qualities and citizens will start to ask questions 
about why they should comply with its rules or why it should be trusted in the first place. 
 
Economizing the public administration 
 
Some political scientists, par excellence Peter Self (1977), have been dismissive of the 
contribution of economists in understanding, assisting, or explaining the policy process. 
However, there is not one but several different types of economic theory, as well as 
theories at different levels and related to different phases of the policy process, and it 
would be clearly misleading to suggest that there is nothing which this analytical 
perspective could offer to public administration or public policy research. Furthermore, 
economic models provide exchanges between state and society on all stages of the public 
administration process. These exchange mechanisms may assist traditional channels of 
input and accountability or they may, conversely, contradict or challenge those channels. 
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Preference formation. In traditional policy making and public administration, 
preference formation and articulation on policy and administrative matters is believed to 
be a complex process involving citizens, political parties and organized interests. There is 
a process of deliberation among individuals and group presenting different views on 
public matters through which preferences are aggregated into policy programs. Policy 
making and administration are compartmentalized functions of government in order to 
ensure that administration is conducted objectively and without partisan bias. 
Participation, deliberation and generating consent are among the values usually 
associated with this traditional model of policy and administration. 
 In a market-based model, preference formation takes place at the output 
side of the political system, where service production meets its customers. By choosing 
among competing service providers, the customer articulates a preference among 
different schools or hospitals or other services. The market model of preference 
formation thus offers the individual an opportunity to voice her/his preference without 
aggregation or interference from intervening actors and interests. Also, this is a quicker 
process compared to the traditional model of democracy and policy making where 
preference formation in a strict sense takes place only on election day. In the market 
model, preferences are formed and articulated every time a public service is utilized. 
 The downside to this arrangement is that it disaggregates the polity 
(Suleiman, 2003) and leaves public debate and participation (in other ways than choosing 
in quasi markets) rather pointless exercises. Also, while the model empowers the 
individual to choose, s/he will have very little influence over the definition of the 
alternatives of those choices. That said, it seems clear that the market model provides a 
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new and more direct channel to voice preferences, compared to the traditional model of 
public service delivery. 
 
Management. Traditional management, or leadership, in the public bureaucracy is based 
on hierarchy, professionalism, autonomy and accountability. Managerial autonomy is 
clearly present, particularly in “public interest” administrative systems, but there is also 
political responsiveness and loyalty to the government of the day. 
 NPM-style management seeks to increase manager’s autonomy in 
relationship to elected officials whose chief roles are to define the long-term objectives of 
the organization. Managerial autonomy is necessary to provide space for the application 
of private sector-style management in terms of resource allocation, human resource 
management and customer relationships (Moore, 1995). The biggest difference between 
the traditional public organization and the NPM-reformed organization is the emphasis 
on middle- and lower-level autonomy to diversify and customize services. This means 
that the hierarchy that characterizes traditional organizational structures, with some 
exaggeration, is put on its head in the NPM version. 
 NPM deprives its political masters some degree of organizational control at 
the same time as it opens up for empowerment of its clients. The influence of economic 
ideas serves to make service production more efficient and customer-attuned. Thus, the 
outcome of assessment is entirely contingent of the selection of yardsticks; do we want a 
public administration which is an administrative instrument of politicians, or do we prefer 
an administration which is geared to cut costs and provides us with choice in terms of 
service providers?  
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 Resource allocation. In traditional public administration, resource allocation is a 
political and administrative matter. Resources are thus ultimately allocated according to 
political preferences. The risks of inefficient resource allocation, due to insufficient 
information, political or parochial biases or organizational self-interests, are significant.  
 The NPM version of resource allocation departs from customer choice and 
feeds back into the budget process. Services, and service providers, in high demand 
receive more resources while under-performing service providers receive less. Best 
practices and leading examples are rewarded, enabling them to further increase the 
quality of their work. Thus, it is the consumers who, through their choice among 
competing providers, ultimately allocate public resources. By removing as many political 
and administrative hands, and heads, as possible from the resource allocation process, the 
risks of inefficient resource allocation are minimized.  
 Economic models remain unchallenged in conducting and analyzing 
resource allocation, a perennial problem in public administration and public service 
production. For all its professionalism, traditional models of public service delivery 
sometimes under-produce services in high demand at the same time as there are other 
services which are rarely demanded. The traditional model is also slow in responding to 
changes in public service demand; those changes will have to be recognized by the 
political and administrative elite, and deliberation and tedious decision-making process 
are required before a real change takes place on the ground. The market-based model is 
clearly better designed to respond to changes in the level and direction of popular 
demand.  
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 Feedback. In the idealized and traditional mode of policy making and administration, 
outcomes are fed back into the system and helps shape future preferences. Such feedback 
is both systemic, i.e., political institutions monitor and evaluate policy outcomes and give 
recommendations and advice for future policy, and based on voters’ perceptions of the 
effects of policies.  
 In the market-based model, by contrast, feedback does not influence future 
preference formation. Instead, by measuring performance and managing the public 
organization based on those measurements, the administrative system becomes more or 
less self-referential. Performance measurement and management is replete with 
conceptual and empirical problems (see Radin, 2006) which sometimes tend to conceal 
rather than reveal the sources of poor performance and give priority to what can be 
measured at the expense of those services that cannot be analyzed that way. In the theory 
of market-based reform, performance measurement is the key feedback mechanism, yet 
as Radin (2006) shows this is a far from perfect feedback instrument. 
 
Accountability. The traditional model of administration has a complex system of 
accountability, including internal audits and investigations of malfeasance. 
Accountability runs from bureaucrats to politicians who, in turn, are accountable to the 
electorate. Unless administrative behavior has been ostensibly in violation of rules 
assigning blame and responsibility is complicated, not only in a political sense but also in 
a legal sense. 
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 The NPM model of service production appears to promise much more 
immediate, distinct and unambiguous accountability. Under-performing service providers 
are punished by the NPM resource allocation system; politicians can “name and shame” 
agencies that do not deliver; and performance measurement provides clear, quantitative 
evidence of where the pay payers money went. 
 Or does it? Who is actually held to account in the NPM model; decision 
makers or service producers (Radin, 2006)? What is actually being measured; is it those 
elements of public service that are easy to measure, or can we say with some confidence 
that all services are appropriately measured? Are performance indicators sensitive to the 
quality of public service in terms of the legality of administrative decisions and 
administrative behavior more broadly, or is performance measurement only a system that 
works on quasi-market, large-scale public service production? These are critical 
questions since much of the NPM model output-based resource allocation and 
accountability ultimately hinges on the quality of the performance measurement. 
 
In sum, market-based reform provides new channels for citizen/customer preference 
formation and accountability which in many ways is quicker and more targeted than the 
channels available to the citizen/voter in the traditional model of policy and 
administration. At the same time, it emphasizes individual values over group values and 
dissolves political constituencies and collectivities. NPM brought individual values into 
the Rechtsstaat administrative systems where they are still trying to find out how to 
accommodate those values alongside group values such as equal treatment and 
procedural fairness.  
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 Furthermore, NPM reform poses a severe problem for the role of the public 
administration in democratic governance (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Suleiman, 2003). 
It replaces the “publicness” of administrative institutions with a generic feature, focused 
on efficient service production that pleases the customer. The side of the administration 
where sensitive, legal decisions related to individual clients are made—decisions 
concerning health care, child protection, incarceration, penalties—and where efficiency 
should not be a priority, increasingly often becomes subjected to the same organizational 
and managerial model that has proven successful in the service production sectors. Thus, 
while market-based reform offers some benefits in terms of citizen empowerment, the 
costs in the larger context of democratic governance are considerable. Again, the choice 
of yardstick holds a great deal of the answer to the questions about costs and benefits.  
 
Concluding discussion 
 
The preceding analysis allows us to ask some broader questions about the relationship 
between markets and economic theory on the one hand, and public administration on the 
other. First of all, what are the democratic downsides to market solutions in the public 
administration, and to what extent can NPM reform open up channels of influence that 
empower the citizen/customer is new ways vis-à-vis the public bureaucracy? With only 
minor simplification, it appears if market-based reform in the public sector has been a 
strategy of purchasing organizational efficiency and customer satisfaction at the expense 
of those organizational features that sustain the “publicness” of the public sector and its 
role in democratic governance. That “publicness” defines the relationship between the 
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bureaucracy and the political echelons of government as well as its relationship to the 
citizens. “Publicness” is shorthand for public ethos, due process, legality, and procedural 
fairness. It cannot be removed from the public sector without severe loss of institutional 
support and legitimacy. It cannot be replaced by market-based models of decision making 
and it cannot be transferred to the market (*Author*, forthcoming). 
 NPM reformers recognized to some extent this state of affairs and therefore 
reform was first implemented where “publicness” is least present and where market 
alternatives were available. Introducing customer choice in the education or health-care 
sector or contracting out water and sewage systems maintenance does not significantly 
challenge the “publicness” of those services. That challenge appears when NPM concepts 
as market choice and organizational efficiency are introduced on the exercise of public 
authority and law where customer choice does not exist and efficiency potentially 
jeopardizes legal security.  
Secondly, what are the core elements of "publicness" that cannot be 
privatized? To some extent this issue is addressed in different ways in “public interest” 
systems and in Rechtsstaat systems of administration. Even so, however, administrative 
reform in both types of systems has reached a point where the issue of what must remain 
public in order to uphold public ethos and other core administrative values has come to 
the forefront. Privatization of the exercise of law seems clearly to be inconsistent with 
maintaining some degree of “publicness”. Furthermore, and coming back to a remark of 
Guy Peters quoted earlier, the structures and functions of governing, broadly defined, are 
at the heart of “publicness”. These might be almost banal statements, but as the 
Blackwater incident in Iraq showed private firms fulfill traditional governmental and 
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military roles even on foreign soil; governments are increasingly reliant on private think 
tanks and consultancies for policy advice; local authorities use consultancies to assess 
clients’ welfare needs; and government agencies use contracts to deliver services that 
even moderately conservative observers would identify as “public”. Clearly, the line 
between what can and cannot be privatized is not carved in stone hence “publicness” is at 
stake. 
 This leads us over to the third and final question; to what extent can private 
sector organizations deliver "public value"? There is now a heated argument about what 
defines public value and how it is reproduced. Public value obviously has both material 
and immaterial connotations. While material public value—essentially public service—
can be delivered by the market, the immaterial type of public value—public ethos, 
legality, equal treatment—cannot be provided by for-profit organizations. Various 
models of “retrofitting” or insisting that private contractors provide some training for 
their staff in public ethos are problematic because they change the incentive structure to 
private firms (*Author*, forthcoming). 
Paradoxical as it might seem, it sometimes appears as if the simplest and 
most obvious solution to the problem has been lost out of sight; letting the public sector 
continue to deliver public value (Olsen, 2006). If a cost-benefit analysis were to be 
conducted on some elements of NPM reform bringing in market mechanisms into the 
public sector, it might well find that the overall costs outweigh the benefits. As this 
article has argued, economic reform in the public sector, implemented specifically where 
it offers improvements in public service and citizens’ empowerment, offers a strong 
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contribution to the modernization of the state whereas when implemented in other public 
sector contexts it may cause more problems than it solves. 
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